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Teresa Scassa*

Nickled and Dimed: The Dispute over
Intellectual Property Rights in the Bluenose II

The Bluenose Schooner forms part of the folk history of Nova Scotia, and is a
Canadian icon. Popular assumptions that Its name and image formed part of the
public domain were put to the test in 2003 when the Bluenose II Preservation
Trust Society brought suit against a Halifax business for Infringement of its official
marks, trademarks and copyrights relating to the ship and its name. The litigation
garnered local and national media attention, and the provincial government soon
became involved in the dispute
In this article, the author provides some background to the dispute before
moving on to consider the merits of the trademark and copyright claims. Because
the infringement suit was eventually dropped as part of an agreement between
the Trust and the Province of Nova Scotia, the legal issues raised by this case
remain unresolved The author argues that the intellectual property claims of the
Trust were largely without merit She is critical of the official marks regime under
the Trade-marks Act. and discusses the boundaries between intellectual property
and the public domain
La goelette Bluenose fait partie du folklore de la Nouvelle-Ecosse et elle est un
symbole canadien Les notions generalement repandues que le nom et I'image
du Bluenose sont dans le domaine public ont 6t6 mises a I'lpreuve en 2003
lorsque le Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society (le Trust) a poursuivi une
entreprise de Halifax pour contrefa;on de ses marques officielles, de ses marques
de commerce et de son droit dauteur quant , la goelette et a son nom. La
poursuite a attire I'attention des medias locaux et nationaux, et le gouvernement
provincial est meme intervenu dans le differend
L'auteure rappelle le contexte dans lequel le diffurend a pris naissance puis
elle examine le bien-fonde des allegations relatives a la marque de commerce et
aux droits d'auteur La poursuite en contrefagon ayant 8te abandonnee dans le
cadre d'une entente entre le Trust et la Nouvelle-Ecosse, les questions de droit
soulevees par laffaire restent sans reponse Lauteure allegue que les allegations
de propriet8 intellectuelle faites par le Trust n'avaient, i son avis, aucun fondement
Elle critique le regime des marques officielles de la Loi sur les marques de
commerce, et discute des limites entre la proprite intellectuelle et le domaine
public.

* Associate Professor, Dalhousie Laxk School; Associate Director, Law and Technology Institute at
Dalhousie Law School. I would like to thank Allan Rodger and Paul Radford for providing me with
access to all of the court documents filed inthis case. Thanks also to Aubrey Guild-Young for his
research assistance on this paper, and to Charles Sanders for his editorial comments and suggestions.
Thanks are also due to Philip Girard. Patrick Fitzgerald and Bob Murphy.
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C'onclulsion

Introdu'ction
The Bluenose schooner is a Canadian icon.' In its first incarnation, launched
in 1921, it \\as a working fishing schooner that became a world class
racing champion.2 The ship has become part of the folk history of Nova
Scotia. But the name of the ship is also a "nickname" for the people of
Noxa Scotia. No\a Scotians have been called "blue nosers" or "blue noses"
since the 1700s.' Popular lore offers a variety of explanations of the origin
of the term. Some say it comes from the Bluenose variety of potatos grown
in the colony and exported abroad.4 Others say it has to do with blue
smudges left on the noses of Nova Scotian fishermen from rubbing their

I
In fact,
thc N\a Scoia Archiccs and Record Management vebsite. NSAR\1 Online, has created a' special online archive for information on the Bluenose titled "Bluenose: A Canadian Icon",
online: --http v,%\
\%go.,ns.cainsarm {NSARNl Online).

2.

thid.

3.

"tto.,
the Bluenose (lot its Name." ibid NSARM Online notes that the first recorded use of the

name %%a%
in 175

4.
Scc Leslie Smith )o\%, "Humble Spud Spa\\ned \\orld Famous Nickname" Halfar Herald,
(Sunda \(,\ember 14. 19Tt). online: <http: homepage,.rootsweb.com -ecross Locations/NS/
bluenow, him>.
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noses with blue mittens, or, in one version, wiping their noses on blue
sleeves.5 In yet another story, it is alleged that the name was given to the
people of Nova Scotia by loyalists who arrived in the province and found
the place so cold and damp that the locals were said to have noses blue
with the cold.' Another account links the name to the blue painted bows of
Nova Scotia whaling ships.7 Whatever the origin, the name predates the
ship, and part of the ship's resonance with the people of Nova Scotia as an
icon flows, no doubt, from the fact that the ship carried the name of the
people of the province. Suffice it to say that both the name and the image
of the ship, which has graced the Canadian dime since 1937,8 are part of
the cultural history of the province, and ultimately of the nation.' Until
recently, most Nova Scotians were comfortable in their belief that the name
and image formed a part of the public domain.'0

I. .4 Chronolog , of the Intellectual Property Dispute

The original Bluenose schooner sank in 1946." In 1963, a replica schooner was built in Lunenburg. The replica, christened Bluenose II, was made

5
"The Legendary Name". online: Atlantic View Elementary School Nova Scotia Department
of Education <http:. A%% .a%es.ednet.ns.ca gr bnpage5 html>.
6.
"Nova Scotia Home of the Bluenosers". online: <http:/iw%%w.renc.igs.net;-tcollier/
novascotia.htm>.
7.

Ibid.

8.
A News Release on the web site of the Canadian Mint indicates that the identity of the schooner
on the dime was confirmed as being the Bluenose in 2002, with the assistance of the Bluenose II
Preservation Trust Society, one of the parties in the litigation discussed in this comment. "Bluenose
Officially Recognized as the Schooner on Canada's 10-Cent Coin",
(March 15, 2002), online: Royal Canadian Mint <http: ,www.mint.ca/en news/pri bluenose.htm>
[News Release]. It would appear that the Canadian Mint also paid a license fee to the Society, presumably for use of the image of the ship which had been used on the dime for oxcr five decades prior
to the inception of the Society. (AffidaN it of Hon. Wilfred P.Moore, QC. in Bluenose H Preservation Trust Soc ieti v Tall Ships Art Production, Ltd., August 5, 2003, at para. 32 [Moore Affidavit]).

9.
As noted earlier, the image of the Bluenose has been on the Canadian dime since 1937. It was
also featured on a Canadian postage stamp in 1929. The NSARM Online refers to the schooner as a
"national institution". It notes that the ship was an "'ambassador" for Canada at the 1933 Chicago
World's Fair, and at the Silver Jubilee of King George V in 1935. NSARM Online, supra note 1.
10. The public domain is an elusive concept. Jessica Litman has described the public domain as "a
true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are ineligible for private ownership.
The contents of the public domain may be mined by any member of the public." (Jessica Litman,
"The Public Domain", (1990) 39 Emory L.J. 965 at 975, Noting that the concept of the "public
domain" has been formally absent in Canadian intellectual property law, Margaret Ann Wilkinson
refers to it as "at least, a powerful rhetorical element in policy debates involving intellectual property." (Margaret Ann Wilkinson, "National Treatment, National Interest and the Public Domain",
(2003-2004) 1 & 2 University of Ottawa Law and Technology Journal 25 at 26.
11. The Canadian owners of the ship had fallen on hard times, and sold the schooner out of country. It was ultimately shipwrecked off the coast of Haiti, NSARM Online, supra note I.
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according to the original design plans for the ship, which were drafted by
naval architect William J. Rou. It,, construction was funded by the Oland
Brc cr\ and the ship wkas used in commercial promotions for the
2
hrc\ crx.1 In 1971, the Oland family sold the Bluenose II to the province
of No\a Scotia for one dollar." For the next two decades the ship was
used to prornote the pro\ ince's tourism industry. In 1993, the ship was
declared unseaworthy, due to a rotting hull. In 1994, the Province of Nova
Scotia entered into an agreement with a group of volunteers, who would
later be the founders of the Bluenose II Preser\ation Trust Society (the
Society). The volunteers undertook to restore the Bluenose II and to
operate the \ cssel on behalf of the province. 4 On November 17, 1994, the
Societ\ \\as incorporated under the Societies Act" - of Nova Scotia. The
objectixcs of the Society \%cre to raise money to make the schooner
seaworthy and to maintain the ship as a sailing monument."' In 1998, the
Pro\ ince of No\ a Scotia entered into a formal contract with the Society
for the maintenance and operation of the schooner.'"
In 195, the family of the late \William J. Rou& donated the copyright
in the original Bluenose plans to the Society." Following the receipt of the
plan, for the Bluenose, the Society began to assert copyright claims in the
image of the Bluenose H." In 1996, Tall Ships Art Productions (Tall Ships),
a Noxa Scotian company that designed and manufactured a variety of
souvenirs and other items for the Nox a Scotian tourism industry, received
a letter from the Society demanding that the company pay a licensing fee
to use the image of the Blue ose II on clothing and other souvenir

12.

Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14.

lorc Affidait. i, iqn note , at para. 5

15
.Shhctl
I
lI t. R.S.N S. 19X 9. c. 435.
16
M cmorandum of Association of Btueno..e II Preserx ation Trust Socicx. Register of Joint Stock
Companies, No. a Scotia, November 17, 1994
17. Contract betxxcen Province of No\ a Scotia and Btuenose 11Preservation Trust Society, April 2,
1998. The contract is for a term of.se\en years and expired on \larch 31. 2005.
I X. Moore Affidavit, supra note 8 at para. 12.
19
Public notice of the Socieiy's copyright interest was given in a notice published in the Halifax
Chronicle-Herald, Saturday. April 20, 1990, at D-13. The notice described the copyright in the plans
and .. diCd "Persons . ho may no.. or who may \%ish to. make use of the said intellectual property
in any \ ares or \\orks x\ hatoever must first obtain permission to do so b\ writing to Bluenose tt
Preser%,ation Trust
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products that it produced.20 Tall Ships was not the only business that
received such a letter."'
In 2001, the Society recct\ed official marks for "Bluenose," "Bluenose 1I Preservation Trust," "The Original Bluenose Clothing Company,"
and "Bluenose II Ship's Compan\ Store," under s. 9(1 )(n)(iii) of the Trademarks Act. 2 This was done \\ ithout the knowledge of the province. 23 The
Society continued with its demands to various businesses for annual
license fees based now, on both its copyright and trademark claims. 2 4 These
25
demands went be\ond local businessCs.
Although many local businesses paid the license fees on demand, 2"
Tall Ships consistently refused to pay. In July of 2003. the Society filed
suit against Tall Ships for cops right and trademark infringement. Spurred
27
on, perhaps, b\ the publicit\ and public outcry caused by the litigation,
the Province sought to intervene in the la\\ suit. " As part of its defense,
Tall Ships commenced a separate action in Federal Court to have the
official marks struck on the basis that the Society was not a public authorit." The Province subsequently made its o\\n application for judicial
re\ ie\\ of the gI\ ing of public notice of the marks.3 Before either the

2o

Letter from Wilfrid P. \oore, Q.C. to Allan Rodger. January 23. 1996. \oore .\ffidav it, supra

note 8.
21. At the time of the litigation, the Socir, claimed to have entered into o\ er one hundred licenses
wth rarious local merchants "'including local craftpeople. small and large businesses. retailers.
manufacturers, government bodies. Crown corporations and media and entertainment companies,"

Moore Affidavit, supra note s. at para. 32.
22.

'Canadian Trademarks Database", online: Canadian IPO <http: ,'strategys.ic gc ca> Trademark

Certificates ,sued Noember 7. 2n0il. file numbers: 1)13512.913511, 9135l0. and 913S3.
23.
h,tion Record ofThc Attornc General of Nova Scotia. tn.ttmnci Gccrl of \oia Scotia v.
Bluenose II PreservationTrust Society, Court File No 0i3-T-410. Notice of ,Moton, 9 October 2003,
at paras. 6-8.
24

See, for example, the demand letter from Marc J. Bellieau (counsel to the Society) to Allan

Rodger, June 24, 2003 in which both trademark and copyight claims are made. Moore Affidavit,
supra note 8.

25 According to the Affida, it of Senator \loore. Cros n corporations, government bodies, and
media and entertainment companies had entered into licenses \\ ith the Socier Moore Affidavit,
supra note s. at para. 32. It is interesting to note that Senator Moore also specifically mentions the

Nova Scotia Department of Tourism and Culture. This would seem to suggest that the Nova Scotia
government paid licensing fees to use the name or image of a ship that it actually owns.
26. Ibid.
27. The case generated a flurry of articles in local newspapers and on local radio and television
news programming. It also generated interest on a national level.
2, See Pre-Hearing Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant Attorney General of Nova Scotia, S.H.
No. 2014198, 28 August, 2003,

29. Notice of Application for Judicial Revtcs, Aueust 28, 2003. This was accompanied by a Notice
Of Motion To Extend Time For Filing Notice Of.Application, 17 September 2003.
30. Notice of Application, Attorney General of .Vova Scotia v Bluenose H PreservationTrust Society, 9 October, 2003.
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law suit or the judicial review applications could proceed on the merits, the
province entered into an agreement ith the Society. Under the agreement, the Society would transfer the disputed marks to the province of
Noxa Scotia and drop its law suit against Tall Ships." It was also announced as part of the agreement that a newk body with input from the
province would be formed to oversee and operate the Bluenose 11. 32 At the
time of writing of this article, talks between the Nova Scotia government
and the Society to create a new oersight body have broken down. 3 The
contract to maintain and operate the Blu'e.c Il expired at the end of March
2)()5. In a press release issued on February 4. 2005, the Department of
Tourism, Culture and Heritage announced that the contract would be
34
awarded to the Lunenburg Marine Museum Society.

11. Intclh'ctual Property Rights in the Bluenose H
Only some of the issucs around the official marks in this case have been
resolved. The marks "Bluenose II" and "'Nova Scotia Bluenose II and
Dcsign'" currently list the government of No\a Scotia as the registrant.
lo\\cer, the marks for "Bluenose". "Bluenose II Ship's Company Store",
"The Original Bluenose Clothing Company" and "Bluenose II Preserx ation Trust" are still listed as official marks held by the Society. In addition,
neither the unregistered trademark nor the copyright issues were addressed
in the settlement. At the time of writing, copy right in the plans for the
Bluenose has been assigned back to the Rou heirs. It is not known what
their plans are xxith respect to the copyright, although the Society's website

3.
Gocrnment of \o\a Scotia News Release -Ne\ Bluenosc II Approach Established Tourism,
Culture and Heritage" (December 22, 2003), online: Government NS <http: iwww.go\.ns.ca news/
dctai,.a,p'
i id 2(i(i31222()i3 The province of \,oa Scotia is currently listed as a public authority
registrant of the official marks "Bluenose", "tBluenose 11'"and 'N\oa Scotia Bluenose 11& design".
Floweer, the S cieiy is also a registrant, a, a public authority, of"Bluenose", "Bluenose 11Ship's
Company Sl re', "The Original Bluenose Clothing Compans " and "Bluenose Ii Preservation Trust".
32. Ibid.
33. Canadian Pre,,, NewN,
,wire, "N S government iils to reach deal Nkith operator of the Bluenose
il". November 22, 2(i04
34 Ne s Releas,. Department of tourism, Culture & Heritage, "Lunenburg Marine Museum Society to Operate iBluenoe i1", February 4, 201)
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asserts copyright on their behalf. Further, because of the settlement with
the province, the merits of the original intellectual property claims have
never been ruled on by a court. .s a result, the public is left with uncertaintv as to whether. but for the intervention of the government, the
Society \\as legitimately in a position to act as it did.
In the information age. and in an increasingly "branded" society,
intellectual property has taken on a very significant commercial value. As
a result, some entities may attempt to acquire intellectual property over
things in which no such rights are likely to exist. It is a kind of intellectual
property "gold rush" in which claims are staked o\ er territory in the public
domain. This approach poses a real threat to the public domain by effectively turning aspects of general culture into a private party's revenue
stream. It also undermines the rights of those wNho cannot resist or respond
to claims because of lack of resources. Instead they are forced to acknowledge the dominion of the other oxer the asserted intellectual property,
regardless of whether the claims to intellectual property haxe merit. In this
paper, I wvill argue that the claims to intellectual property rights asserted in
the Bluenose H litigation \\ere flimsy at best. Although the public interest
and public good were asserted as motix ating factors in the assertion of the
intellectual property claims. I will argue that the impact on the public and
the public domain \\as largely negatiNe. In the pages \\hich follow, I \\ill
examine each of the intellectual property claims made in this case: rights
in official marks. common law trademarks and copyright. In each case I
\sill critically examine the underlying legal principles, and assess the
merits of the claims.
1. Official ark.\
The most significant aspect of the Society's law suit against Tall Ships was
a claim that its official trademarks had been infringed. 36 The Society held

35. The %chsiteof the Blueno se II Preseration Trust Socict, asscrts cop,,nght in the following
manner: "Bluenose II Preservation Trust i, the registered tmner of the copright in the original
work authored and created by " iliam James Roue more particularl\ described as the hull and keel
profile. the deck plan. the water line, the transom and the sail plan for the gaff-rigged two-masted
schooner called BLUENOSE. and the replica thereof called BLUENOSE II, entitled "Design Nt,. 17
- BLUENOSE"
No part of this file or the aforesaid work may be reproduced in any form or any means without
permission in writing from Bluenose II Preservation Trust" Online: Blucno.. 11Preservation Trust
Society <http:' ww .bluenose2.ns.ca-.
36. 1have identified this as the most significant part of their claim because the official marks were
actually held by the Trust (even though. as I will argue, they were of questionable validity).
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a series of official marks dating back to when the Registrar of Trade-marks
gave public notice of the marks in 2001. In order to examine the entitlement of the Society to these marks, it is necessary first to review the case
law on official marks.
a. Public. uthoritv Status
Section 9 of the Trad-marks -.4ct 7 sets out a scheme which automatically
remo\cs a series of official symbols and designations from the realm of
ordinary trade and commerce." In addition to the specific marks, the adoption or use of which is prohibited under s. 9, s. 9(1 )(n)(iii) also allows
entities which are "public authorities" to request the Registrar of Trademarks to gixe public notice of their adoption and use of particular names
or symbols. These marks are referred to as "official marks". Once notice
is given, these official marks are also removed from the general realm of
trade and commerce. Section 9( 1)(n)(iii) reads:
9.( 1) No person shall adopt in connection \%ith a business, as a trade-mark
or otherwise, any mark consisting of. or so nearly resembling as to be
likely to be mistaken for,
(n) any badge, crest, emblem or mark ...
(iii) adopted and used by any public authority, in Canada as an official
mark for vN
ares or serv ices,
in respect of which the Registrar has, at the request of Her Majesty or of
the uni\ ersitv or public authority, as the case may be, gien public notice
of its adoption and use ...
Section 9(1 )(n )(iii) of the Act is controversial, and for good reason." The
provision gives an enormous advantage to go emnment bodies and "public
authorities" \\ ith respect to trade-mark rights.' Section 9(1) prohibits
anyone else from adopting an official mark. The prohibition is absolute.
With a regular trademark, another trader may register an identical or simi-

37. Trade-narks A4ct, R.S.C. 1985, c. T- 13.
18. For example. under ,. 11 of the Trade-niark, Ai. ibid., the use of an\ mark adopted contrary to
s. 9( 1 } is prohibited.
39. Vaver olffrs the following critique of the system in place for public authority marks: "More
institution, have taken ad\ antagc of it than wa, originally contemplated; its effect on existing users
is not well thought out; and no reason esisIs \\hy many official mark o\ ners should not seek registration as those in the private commercial sector do." ( [)a id \ a\ cr. Intellectual Propei'tv, (Concord
.
Ont.: Ir\N in Ld\%.1997, at 2(),
40
See A. Da%id Morrow, "Official Marks" in Gordon F. Henderson, ed., Trade-Atarks Law of

Canada, (Toronto Carswells, 19-),, at 377-389
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lar mark as long as it is in relation to different wares or scrvices and there
is no likelihood of confusion. Not so with official marks. Once declared as
such, others are barred from adopting marks that are identical to or "so
nearl\ resembling as to be likely to be mistaken for" the official mark.'
Further, the usual formalities required for trademark registration are not
required for the adoption of official marks. A public authority need only
request that the Registrar gi\ e public notice of its adoption and use of a
mark. The Registrar does not scrutinize the mark to determine if it is
registrable, and there is no opposition proceeding. 2 An official mark can
be descripti\e and is not required to be distinctie of the public authority's
wares or services." It may also be confusingly similar to an already existing mark. W Any challenge to the valldit\ of the mark must be made through
the vehicle of an application forjudicial review of the Registrar's decision
to give public notice of the adoption and use of the mark.4" There is also
no requirement to renex\ such marks: once declared their duration is
potentially unlimited."'
The enormous statutory advantages of official marks were commented
upon by Cattanach J. in Insurance Corp. ,f British Columbia t: Registrar

of Trade-mar-ksY

He noted:

A public authorit may embark on a venture of supplying wares and
serx ices to the public and in doing so adopt an official mark. Having
done so, then all other persons are precluded from using that mark and, as
a result of doing so, on its o\\n inittati\e, the public authority can
appropriate unto itself the marks so adopted and used by it\xithout
restriction or control other than its own conscience and the ultimate wxill
of the electorate expressed b\ the method available to it."

41

Section 9(1), Trade-marks Act, supra note 37.

42

These features of official marks hase been commented upon in a number of cases See, for

example. ('aiiad,an Jeiiih
er
Chmien People \tnistric\, Itc..[2003] I F.C. 29 20012
Carswellsat 1 54. at para, 22-25 [C'anadianJe"i h C-'ntcs] OntariIio ,iation ofArchitects v
N .ciation of lrchitecturalTeh,,,,'hIt'. !2ii031 I F.C. 331 2002 C arswelNat 2257, at paras. 3336 [Ontario .4)ciatton ol .Irchitects].
41
Ontario .
, iation ,,4Irchitects, ibid. at para. 34 As noted in ('anadianJeiish Congres.,
ibid. at para. 24. "An applicant need not demonstrate the distinctieicss of the proposed official

mark or establish any secondary meaning '
44
45.

Ontario .4%ociation 1l4rchitects. supra note 42 at para. 34
Supra note 42 at paras. 39-40

4,, Official marks form part of the category of"prohibited marks" under s.9 of the Trade-mark s
At.As such, they are marks o hich other traders are prohibited from registering under s.12(1 )(e), or
adopting and using under s. I1.
They are not themsels cs registered trademarks. The renewal requirement in s. 46 of the Act refers to the renewal of a "registration."
47. Insurance Corporation ofBC (1979) 44 C.P.R. (2d) I (FCT.D.)
4x

Ibid., at para. 75.
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It is significant that Cattanach J. refers to the will of the electorate as a
check on the use of official marks by public authorities. This check is
obviously only elfecti'e if the term "public authority" is limited to those
bodies that are in any xay responsive, directly or indirectly, to the will of
the electorate. 4 ' Yet the "public authority" requirement has been a poor
gatekeeper, in part, perhaps, because of the lack of provision for a
pre-emptive challenge to the granting of such marks. Over the years,
public notice has been given to marks at the request of a wide range of
organizations, many of x\hich may well not qualify as "public authorities. " 5"' It is only xery recently that the Federal Court has begun to more
clearly articulate the criteria that must be met for an entity to qualify as a
public authority. The issue is an important one. As noted in the above quote
from Insurance Corp. '4 British Columbia, the limits on the exercise of
the powers floxx ing from an official mark are only the public authority's
conscience and "the \Nill of the electorate."" Without a sufficient governmental nexus. there "ould be no real check ot any kind on the extraordinary scope of official marks.
The 2002 Federal Court of Appeal decision in Ontario Association of
41r'hitect.\ v. .- s.sti.ol .- rchitectural Technologists o1 Ontario 52 is now the
leading case on the issue oftx hat constitutes a "public authority" under s.
9( 1)(n)(iii) of the Act. In that case, the Court confirmed the two-part test
consisting of "government control and public benefit." 3 At issue in Ontario
Association of.4rchitect. \\ as the status of the Association of Architectural
Technologists of Ontario (AATO). This latter group had requested that the
Registrar of Trade-marks gixe public notice of certain official marks under s. 9(1 )(n)(iii) of the Act. The Ontario Association of Architects (OAA)
challenged the status of the AATO as a public authority after the Registrar
gaxc public notice of the marks. After the trial judge ruled that the AATO
xxas a public authority, the decision \\as appealed to the Federal Court of
Appeal.

49

In spite fl the enormous adantages of s. 9(1 )(nh)(m) marks oserreguIar trade-marks, there are

some statutory requirements. The mark must ha\c been "'adopted and used", the adoption and use
must be by 3 "pubic authorit in Canada". and the adoption and use must be "as an official mark for
\kares or Ner\ ice " ( Trade-inirks .- ht. supra note 37. , 9( I i(n)(iii)).
5). In (anadian Rehabilitation ( oincil lor the Disabled i Rehabilitation Foundation lor the Disahled (2004), 35 C.P.R. (4th) 270. at para. III. the court noted: "The Registrar's decision whether to
issue a public notice under s. Q( I )(n)(iii) is based simplN on the applicant's assertion that it is a
public authority thii has adopted and used the mark in question."
5 1. hi , urantc Corp o B. C., supra note 47 at 75
.,upa note 42
52
53. Ihid at para. 52. This test %kispreviouui, laid out by the court in Canadian Olvrnpic-Assn. v.
, (1 ,S). [1983] 1 FC. 6,Q2. ,7 C.P.R. (2d) 59 (C.A.).
Canada (Registrar o/ bthudc/ 1
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Evans J.\., who wrote for a unanimoUs panel of the Court, confirmed
that the test for a "public authorit\'" required the body in question to be
under government control and operating for the public benefit. 5 The Court
\xas not specificall\ required to consider the issue of what would meet the
"public benefit" aspect of the two-part test because they had found a lack
of government control o\ er the .--TO. Nevertheless, Evans J.A. chose to
address the issue. He noted that. "in determining \hether a body's functions are sufficiently for the public benefit, a court may consider its
objects. duties and powers. including the distribution of its assets."" He
further observed that "a duty to do something that is of benefit to the
public is relevant as an element of "public benefit", een though it is not a
"'public duty" in the sense of being legally enforceable by a public law
remedy..."5" Exans .t \ noted that the ..\..\T() x\as a self-regulating body
whose regulatory actiities offered some benefit to that part of the public

7
requiring the services of an architectural technician or technologist5 The
fact that the activities of the AATO also benefited its members did not
obscure the benefit to the public.
The Court seems to establish a fairly lo\ threshold for determining
whether a "public benefit" eists It is sufficient if the activities of the
organization offer some benefit to the public. the fact that members of the
organization may also benefit does not negate the existence of a public
benefit. Yet the low threshold for finding a public benefit is far from determinative of an organization's status as a public authority. Of the two
requirements, that of government control is by far the more important.
There are a wide range of organizations that can be said to offer some form
of benefit to the public. So. in order to place any reasonable limit on the
ability of organizations to obtain the highly advantageous marks axailable
under s. 9(1 )(n)(iii) the organization providing the public benefit must do
so under the control (and not simply the blessing) of government.
Past court decisions haxe provided some guidance on the interpreta-

tion of"government control". In CanadianO'vmpic.4ssociation v. Regis-

trarof Trademarks," the Federal Court of Appeal found five indicia that,
together, satisfied it that the Canadian Olympic Association (COA) was
under government control: the COA x\as incorporated by statute; should

54

Ontario ., wc'iaton , frchitccts. ihid. at para. 51.

55.

Ibid. at para. 52.

56.
57.
58.

Ibid.
Ibid- at para. 68.
Canadian Ovn"pic.,4swciation. supra note 5 13.
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the COA surrender its charter, the federal government would dispose of its
assets in conjunction with the International Olympic Committee; the COA
is substantially funded by government with some level of government
monitoring of the disposition of its funds, the demonstration of influence
brought to bear by the federal government over the decision of the COA to
boycott the 1980 Olympics; and the close relationship between the COA
and government officials in various functions of the COA.5 9
The criteria identified in Canadian Olympic Association point to a
substantial degree of government involvement in the COA. However, the
first indicator that of being a creature of statute later became a leverage
point for organizations claiming public authority status. In Ontario
Association of lrchitects, the Federal Court of Appeal noted that simply
because a body is a creature of statute that is not in itself sufficient to
resolve the issue of government control.6" There must be some kind of
"ongoing government supervision of the activities of the body claiming to
be a public authority ... "' In the case of the AATO, the only "governmental control" that it could point to in the enabling legislation was the power
of the legislature to amend its enabling legislation to change its statutory
objects, povers and duties. According to Evans J.A., "[t]his is insufficient
to satisfy the governmental control test because it is not a power that
enables go emnment, directly or through its nominees, to exercise a degree
of ongoing influence in the body's governance and decision-making ... 62
The Court's interpretation is strongly influenced by public policy concerns.
Evans J.A. notes the exceptional nature of trademarks granted under s.
9( 1)(n)(i ii), and the verv substantial advantages of these marks over regular registered trademarks. In his view. this means that s. 9( 1)(n)(iii) "should
not be given an expansive meaning by equating the need for legislative
'
amendment with government control."M
Government control may require some ongoing participation of
members of government. In Anne of Green Gables Licensing Authority,
Inc. v AvoIlea Traditions Inc.,"4 the Ontario Supreme Court was asked,
inter alia, to determine whether the Anne of Green Gables Licensing
Authority (AGGLA) constituted a public authority. The AGGLA had been
established by agreement between the Province of Prince Edward Island

59
60,
61
62
63
(64

Ibid. at 69 (cited to C.P.R.' \.
Onlarit). I
tutm i)/,Irchitc~t, supra note 42, at para. 58.
Ihid at para. 59
Ibid. at para. 62
Ibid. at para. 64
)
(200(), 4 C.PR. (4'1 289 (Ont. S.C.).
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and the heirs of Lucy Mlaud Montgomery to promote the legacy of Lucy
Maud Montgomery and her \\orks. Although the issue did not ultimately
need to be decided to resolve the dispute, Wilson J. agreed that the AGGLA
met the criteria of government control and public benefit. In particular, he
noted the significant control exercised by the P.E.I. government over the
activities of the AGGLA through the participation of members of the
65
government on its operating committee.
In CanadianJewish Congress vt Chosen People Ministries, Inc.,6 6 the
Federal Court Trial Division applied the two-pronged test of public
authority as laid out in OntarioAssociation ofArchitects. The Canadian
Jewish Congress (CJC) sought judicial rexiJew of a decision of the Registrar of Trade-marks who gave public notice under s. 9(l )(n)(iii) of the
Trade-marks .-lt of the adoption and use by the Chosen People Ministries
Inc. (CPM) of a design mark consisting of a representation of a menorah.
CPM was a U.S. based non-profit Christian organization that had as its
sole objectixe "the spread of the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ among
the Jews in the United States of America and in all parts of the world."6
The Registrar had initially denied recognition of the mark; the Registrar
later reversed this decision without reasons, after a request for reconsideration by the CPM.
The CJC's primary argument was that CPM was not entitled to the
mark because it was not a public authority. The CPM countered that it was
a public authority in part because it was "incorporated as a non-profit
corporation with charitable objects, has obtained tax-exempt status, the
ability to issue charitable receipts to donors", " and could be compelled by
government to provide its financial and accounting records to the Public
Guardian and Trustee of Ontario." Blais J. found all of these elements to
be insufficient to establish the status of the CPM as a public authority.
Noting that all charitable organizations are subject to government regulation, he observed that "as soon as they comply with the regulations in
place, the charitable organizations are not subject to "significant" government control."7 In commenting on the indicia of control not present in the

65. Ibid. at para. 170. The Board of Directors of the Authority consisted of 8 members. Three
were nominees of the government, three were nominees of the heirs, and two others were jointly
nominated by the government and the heirs.
66. CanadianJewish Congress, supra note 42
67. Ibid. at para. 3, quoting from the group's certificate of incorporation.

68.

Ibid. at para. 55.

69.
70.

Ibid.
Ibid.
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case of(CPM, Blais J. noted that: "'PM's property is not to be disposed of
at the direction of the government. The CPM is not funded by the Government of Canada or the United States and is in no way subject to monitoring
by the government in any shape or form."Blais J. referred to the court's earlier decision in Big Sisters Assn. of
Ontario v. Big Brothcr. o/Canada'- where the status of a charitable organization as a "public authority" was also at issue. In that case, the court
stated:
On the facts before me, the parties to this litigation were clearly dedicated
to the public good. but I am not sure that they were under a "duty" to the
public. Nor does the e\ idence diIcloe that they were subject to a significant
degree of governmental control.It is interesting that the court in Big Sisterv appears to reject the status of
the groups as public authorities not solely on the ground that charitable
organizations lack sufficient gox ernment control, but also on the basis that
being dedicated to the public good is not the same as being under an inherent duty to provide a benefit to the public. In Canadian Jewish Congress,
Blais J. seems to accept that the CP\1 failed to meet both aspects of the
public authority test: it \\ as not under go emnment control, nor did it owe a
duty to the public. The case \xas later appealed to the Federal Court of
Appeal. In a brief oral judgment b\ Sexton J.A. the court upheld the decision of Blais J.. although it did so solely on the basis that the CPM was not
under go'. emient control. 4
The case la\\ on s. 9(1 )(n)(iii) makes it clear that the most important
element of the t\v\o-part test for "public authority" is that of go'.ernment
control. Past cases also sho'.'. a judicial a' areness that public authority
trademarks are exceptional and confer substantial benefits on the holders
of such marks.'. As such, the decision in Ontario A.sociation of.4ichitects
should be read as one that mandates a more restricti'e approach to
construing "go ernment control" on any given set of facts.

71
Ihid. at para. 57.
72
(1997), 75 C P.R. (3d) 177 1997 Cars,\elNat 7,83 (F.-',T.D.) [Big Sivtvr].
73. Ihid at pard S6
74 The issuc of public bcnefit was not addrc.',ed Canadian Jewish (ong'rc..s Cmin
(,
People
Min.strc In . 203fl CA
' 272. 231 D.L.R. (4h ) 309 2003 Car,\ clINat 188l
75. See, lor example, C'nadian Jciith Congre\'Y. supra note 42 at paras. 22-25. Ontario 4Nocialion ,/AIrhI i/, s. iit ia notc 42 at paras. 34-30, and parai 63-64
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b. Is the Bluenose I1Preservation Trust Society a Public.4lthoritv
As noted earlier, in the fall of 2001, the Registrar of Trade-marks gave
public notice of the adoption and use by the Society as a public authority
of the marks "'Bluenose", "'Bluenose I1Preservation Trust", "Bluenose II
Ship's Company Store", and "The Original Bluenose Clothing Company."
In their application to invalidate the official marks, Tall Ships argued that
the Society did not have the status of a public authority as required under
s. 90)(1(n)1iii).
The Society was created in 1994 under the Societies Act 7" of Nova
Scotia. The objects of the Society are set out in its Memorandum of Association as follows:
(a) To raise and hold in trust capital for the purpose of refurbishing
the vessel "Bluenose II".
(b) To promote the use of the Bluenose H as an educational and
historical ambassador for the pro, ince of Nova Scotia.
(c)To preserx e Nova Scotias heritage and its traditional craft of building wooden vessels b\ maintaining the Bluenose II as an
educational and historical sailing monument.
(d) To buy. own, hold, lease, mortgage, sell and convey such real and
personal property' as may be necessary or desirable in the carrying
out of the objects of the Society.
(e) To acquire by \Nav of grant, gift, purchase, bequest, devise or
otherwise, real and personal property and to use and apply such
propertN to the realization of the objects of the Society.
(f) To generally promote the affairs of the Society.7 7
While it can be argued that the functions of the Society have some public
benefit, as noted above, the public benefit aspect of the test for public
authority status is not the key element in the test. Crucial to the test is
"government control". Given the case law outlined above, it is difficult to
see how the Society could even come close to meeting the necessary level
of government control to qualify as a public authority. It is not a creature
of statute, and there is no formalized government oversight or control."8

76. Societies.4c . R.S.N S. 1989, c. 435
77. Memorandum of Association of Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society, s2387178, November
17, 1994.
78. On November II, 1994, the Minister in charge of the Nova Scotia Economic Renewal Agency
sent a letter toWilfred P Moore, the Chair of the Society. indicating that it "consents" to the incorporation of the Bluenose II Preservation Trust Societv under the Soc ictic Act. It is difficult to see
how "consent" to a society's incorporation can be construed as any form of control. [Letter from
Minister Ross Bragg to Hon. Wilfred P Moore, Q C (November 17, 19941 on file with the Office of
the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies.]
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Unlike the .\( (ILAin Inne of Green Gables LicningAuthoriv, there are
no _goxernment members or representatives on its Board of Directors."9
Further, in contrast with CanadianOlyvmpic Association, in the event that
the Society's operations are terminated or xwound up, its assets are to be
"'paid to some other charitable organization in Canada, having objects
similar to those of the Society."" There are simply no indicia of government control in the establishment or operation of the Society that would
suppoil a finding of public authorit\ status.
The argument of government control is further undermined by the fact
that the actual ship, the Bluenose 11 is owned by the Province of Nova
Scotia. The province asserts an ongoing interest in using the ship and its
image to promote trade and tourism in Noxa Scotia." The province's
relationship with the Society began in 1994, when it entered into a
contract with the Societ\ w.hereby the Society became responsible for the
maintenance and operation of the Bluenose II.At the time of the litigation
in this matter, the operating agreement was set to expire in March of 2005.
In its Pre-Hearing Submissions in its application for leave to intervene in
the case, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia noted that "[u]nless renewed
or replaced, once the current operating agreement expires the Society will
cease to have an' authority o\er the maintenance or operation of the
Bluenosc II."" It is difficult to see how a limited term contract between a
goverinment and a society for the operation and maintenance of a piece of
go'ernment property can elev ate the society to the status of a public
authority. 3
Quite apart from the lack of any credible basis for arguing that the
Societ\ is a public authority, the Province of Nova Scotia in its application
for leave to intervene in the litigation stated:

7L

in7 the original five members of the aisocation, three were lawyers. and ts o were business-

men.
80. \lemorandum of Association. iipra note
sI.
Pre-hearing Submisioons on Behalf of the Applicant Attorne\ General of Nova Scotia, August
2X. 20103, S.H. No 204198, at para. 5
X2
Ihid at para. 7.
93. The contract bet, een the government and the trust for the maintenance and operation of the
Bluenose II pro ided that the gox ernment \%ould pay the Society the amount of S650,000 per year to
be applied towards maintenance and operation costs of the vessel The agreement also acknowledges that the government is the o%%
ner of the ,essel. The contract deals exclusively \%ith issues
relating to the operation and maintenance of the Bluenose I1. Agreement Between Her Majesty the
Queen in Right of the Pro\ tnc of No~a Scotia and Bluenose II Preservation Trust Society, April 2,
I 9 (Motion Record of Attornes General of Nova Scotia in Attornev General of Nova Scotia v.
Bluen,,sc II Prcscriatin Triul S i cti . Fed. Ct. File # 03-T-49).
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Tile Department ofTourism and Culture, the Department that is primarily
responsible for the Bhtcnw,sc I on behalf of the Province of Nova Scotia,
has ne\ er accepted the scope of rights claimed by the Society and believes
that it has exclusixe rights relating to the name "Bluenose I1" and the
image of the Blttcnoset H.

This clear opposition bv the Province of Nova Scotia to the intellectual

property claims of the Society indicates that the Society was not under any
form of go\ernment control. The fact that the Society managed to obtain
such marks, and to use them to compel \rarious parties to pay licence fees
to the Society as a consequence is indicative both of a major flaw in the
trademark regime, and a lack of effective intellectual property management on the part of the government of Nova Scotia.
c. O/ficial Marks in Ned of Reform

The case of the Bluenose II highlights serious issues that have been raised

elsewhere, s about the process by which official marks are granted. It is
not clear on what basis the Registrar decided that the Society was a public
authority, as the Registrar is not required to give reasons. The legislation
contains no mechanism \\hereb\ any application for such marks can be
subject to scrutiny or opposition. Because the marks are not advertised
before the Registrar gix es public notice of their status as official marks,
there is no possibility for interested parties to raise objections or challenge
the status of the alleged "public authority" before the marks are entered
onto the trademarks register. An\ challenge to such marks invol\cs the
initiation of costly judicial re\ ie\w proceedings.
It has been suggested that s. 9( 1 )(n)(iii) may \iolate the CanadianBill
of Rights because it fails to provide "the right to a fair hearing in accordance wvith the principles of fundamental justice" for the determination of
one's rights and obligations." This violation would arguably arise
because the Trade-marks Act fails to provide a means by which official
marks can be challenged before public notice of them is given. This can

84,

Pre-Hearing Submissions on Behalf of the Applicant Attorney General of Nova Scotia, in Blue-

nose H PreservationTrust Society v Tall Ships Art Productions. S.H. No. 20419,

August 28, 2003,

at para. 9.
85, See, for example, Vaver, supra note 39, and Morrow, supra note 40. See also the comments of
the judges in Ontario ,, ssciation f Architects, supra note 42, at paras. 33-36, and Canadian Jewish
Congress, supra note 42 at paras. 22-25.

86, Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960 c 44. See Mark L. Robbins. "What's New on Official
Marks" (2003) 20 C.I.P.R. 221 at 233.
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significantly disadxantage a party. In the case of the Blueno.se II, the
defendant was sued tor trademark and copyright infringement in Nova
Scotia Supreme Court. In order to raise the validity of the official marks
in its defence, Tall Ships had to make a separate application to the Federal
Court for judicial review of the decision of the Registrar to give public
notice of the marks. Because the limitation period for judicial review had
expired, Tall Ships also had to make an application for an extension of the
time limits for bringing the application. An opposition proceeding might
be a less expensi\e process than this sort of after-the-fact challenge.
It is clear that the courts in recent ,'ears ha\ e become more stringent in
their approach to public authority status under s. 9(1 )(n)(iii). The Federal
Court has ackno\\ ledged the exceptional character of official marks and
the remarkable ad\antages the' offer over regular trademarks. In such a
context it is of crucial importance to ensure that only those entities that
truly are public authorities have access to such marks. While the legislation could be amended to offer greater transparency to the process of issuig such marks, it might also be \\orth considering whether the full range
of advantages that accompany such marks truly serve the public interest.' "
A final observation remains regarding the official marks in this case.
.\s noted earlier, the Society remains the holder of four official marks,
even though, as argued above, it does not meet the criteria for a "'public
authority". Once declared, these marks remain in effect unless and until
they are ina lidated through judicial reviewx proceedings. Currently, both
the provincc of No\a Scotia and the Society are holders of the official
mark "Bluenose"; the scheme under the Act contains no mechanism to
a%old this anomalous result.
2. Oheir Trademark Claims
It should be noted that the Society also claimed infringement of a number
of unregistered "common law'" trademarks. The most significant of these
were the names "'Bluenose" and "Bluenose IlI." Because the case did not
proceed to trial, there is little in the %\ayof an evidentiary record, and
therefore it is difficult to discuss these claims in anv detail. However, in
order to establish these names as unregistered trademarks belonging to the

s7
For cample, Morrow, supra note 40, at 3,Nt*
calls for reform
98
The other unregistered marks claimed were: Bluenose 11 Preservation Trust, The Original
Bluenose (othing Company, Bluenose ii Ship', (ompan. Store, and a Bluenose II three-sail logo
found on the Trust stationer, and other items. There "ecrc
no specific allegations of infringement of
the marks for the Clothing Company, the Compan Store, or the Society The real issues seemed to
turn on the use of the Bluenose and Bluenose ii names
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Society, a number of \ cry significant hurdles \\ould have to be overcome.
The Societ, would not onl\ have to establish goodwill and reputation in
the marks,"' it would also ha\e to shox\ that it (the Society) was the owner
of that goodwvill and reputation."' Since the Society only came into being
in 1994. and Tall Ships had been manufacturing and selling wares
imprinted with the image and name of the Bluenose and Bluenose II for
oxer a decade prior to that, the argument that the "marks" were distinctive
of the Society would be a tough one to make. Further, as is clear from the
No\ a Scotia archi\ es, the name "Bluenose" \\as widely used across Nova
Scotia in the names of publications, incorporated companies, businesses,
rail\\aN ser\ ices and boats. " ' These include the wvell known Bluenose 11
restaurant on Hollis Street in Halifax which has been in operation since
the mid-1960s. The image of the Bluenose has been on the Canadian dime
since 1937, the ship's image has also been used on Noxa Scotia licence
plates since 1989. It would be difficult for the Society to establish that the
ordinary consumer of tourist \ares would associate the name Bluenose or
Bluenose II \\ ith the Society as a source. If there is any particular association between the names Bluenose and Bluenose II and a particular source,
it is likely the ship itself. \\hich belongs to the Nova Scotia government.
3. Copyright in the Image of the Bluenose
The Society's assertion of copyright in the image of the schooner has not
been addressed or resolved bv a court, and any agreement made x\ ith the
Province at the time the law suit in the Tall Ships litigation was dropped
did not touch on the copyright claims. E\ en after the agreement x\ ith the
Province, the website of the Societv continued to assert copyright in the
image of the Bluenose II although this time on behalf of the Rou heirs,
and the unresolved claims leave businesses, artists, photographers and other
members of the Nova Scotia community who use the image of the Blue-

89.

Ciba Geiti Canada Ltd. v Apotex. [I 'Lu2] 3 S.(.R. 120 at 132.
Smith & \c heph Inc. v Glen Oak Inc. i I96, 68 C.PR. (3d) 15 3 (F.CA.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. denied.
91. \SARM, supra note 1. The Noxa Scotia Archises and Record Management website indicates
that there ha, been ongoing marketing and commercial acti\ ity regarding the name of the ship (and
even its image) over many years and acro.ss man',. businese, The Archixes wNebsite goes on to note
that several other boats before the famous schooner bore the name Bluenose. A quick canvass of the
Halifax phone directory reveals the following listings: Bluenose Accounting and lax Services, Bluenose Bottle Exchange. Bluenose Fundraising Scr\ ices, Bluenose I1 Restaurant, Bluenose Inn and
Suites, Bluenose Laundromat, Bluenose Lighting and Alarm Inc., Bluenose \lini Market, Bluenose
Optical, Bluenose Soaring Club, Bluenose ,ending Ser', ices Ltd., Bluenose Video, Bluenose Water
Cleaners, and Bluenose Well Drilling. (Aliant Phone Directory, V hitc Pages, 2004).
90
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no.d' on an uncertain tooting with respect to the copyright claims.92
a. Copyright in Naval Architectural Plans
The Society's claim to copyright in the image of the ship was based on its
copyright in the plans fbr the ship drafted by naval architect William J.
Rou&. Ownership of the plans and their attendant copyright had been transferred to the Society in 1995.3 The plans consisted of: "the hull and keel
profile, the deck plan, the waterline, the transom, and the sail plan for the
gaff-rigged two-masted Schooner called Bluenose and the replica thereof
called Bluenose 11."" The Soclety also claimed, as a source of its rights,
o books about the Bluenose H,15 which copyrights had
the copyright in txv
also been transferred to the Society." '
The essence of the Society's claim, it would seem, flows from the line
of cases that ha, e established that itis possible to infringe copyright in
tx\ o-dimensional drawings by making the three dimensional object depicted
in those dra\\ ings. In King Features Syndicate, Inc. v 0. & Afl. Kleeman,9 7
the House of Lords found that copyright in drawings of the cartoon
character Popeye were infringed by dolls and brooches made based on the
character. According to Lord Wright. " ... the sole right to produce or

)2 Itis also interesting to note that in its nter\ ention in the Tall Ships litigation the Nova Scotia
government seems to recr\e to itself some form of copyright oer the ship. In it. Pre-Hearing
a Scotia stated that: "...
the
Submissions, %upranote 81, at para. 21, the Attorney-General of \o%
right to restrict, or not restrict the use of the name and image of the Bluenose IIis a right specifically
claimed by the Pros irce of '\o\a Scotia, Ahich right it\ tes s as having been acquired \kith ownership of the \essel, either by virtue of an associated or implicit transfer of a copyright or other intellectual property interest with title, or as an incident of ownership separate and apart from copyright
or intellectual properx issues." There is no elaboration of what is actuall\ meant here, but the
concept of an -implicit transfer of a copyright or other intellectual property," \%ith the transfer of the
thing ssould seem inconsistent k%
ith basic intellectual property principles.
ownership of a phy stcal
93, On Februar, 9,21115 itss asreported that the Trust had assigned the copy right in the plans back
totheRoucfamly 'See Peter ,lcLaughlin. "Trust giv%,e
Bluenose image copyrights to family", Halifax
Daily Ncws. February 9. 2005
94
\loorc .\ffida\ it,
supra note 8 at para. 12.
')5 The books are: Latham B. Jenson, Blueno%,, II - Saga of the Great Fishing Schooners. (Camden
Tall Schooners.
%if Dos\ n Iast Books. 19()s) and Latham B Jenson, Bluenose II The Last ,/ithe
thasured Drati ings. Hali fJ\ Bluenose Designs. 1975)
96. One T-Shirt produced by Tall Ships Art Productions featured dras, ings from Jenson's Bluenose
II
The Last of the Tall ,Schooners Whacured Drawings, ibid. Presumably, therefore, copyright
infringement was also being alleged with respect to this T-Shirt. However. Tall Ships had filed a
letter from Nimbus Publishing Ltd., indicating that permission had been granted to Tall Ships to
reproduce the image on T-Shirts as a means of promoting sales of the books. (Letter from Dan
Scoucoup t,Paul Radford (August 25, 2003) \ffidayit of Allan Rodger, S.H. No. 204198, September5 2103 )
97 [19411 .C.417 (H.
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reproduce the sketches or an\ substantial part thereof in any material form
\ hatsoe\ er would cover a reproduction of a substantial part of the sketches
or aiv of them in three-dimensional forn.
In Bavlin'r Marine Coi-T). v. Doral Boats Ltd.," Walsh J. of the Federal
Court Trial Div ision ruled that copyright in the design plans for a boat hull
could be infringed b\ the making of the three dimensional object depicted
in the plans. He wrote:
... when one looks at plaintiff's txmo boats in question it can be seen that
they are derived from the dra\xing,,, and while the drawings themselves
were not copied b\ defendant, the intermediate object made from them,
in this case the boats, x\as admittedly copied ... ""'

In Bailiner, the court was influenced by two English cases, L.B. (Plastics)
Ltd. v. Swish Product.s Ltd.."" and British Levland .1lotor Coip. Ltd. v.
Art'mstrong Patents Co. Ltd."" In each of these cases, the courts found that
copyright in design drawings of utilitarian objects were infringed by the
making of the three-dimensional objects depicted in the drawings. 3 The
decisions are not without contro\ers-. Although in most cases the full
impact of these findings is muted b\ the interrelationship of the Copyright
Act and the Industrial Design .4ct. ' " the cases have been criticized on
public policy grounds. 0 5 Indeed, in the British Levland case, the majority
of the House of Lords acknowledged that the impact of their decision that
the making of a car muffler as a spare part would infringe copyright in the
car manufacturer's design drawings for the muffler, would be to suppress
the market for auto spare parts, and to drive up the price of spare parts by
eliminating competition in that market. '" As a result, although they found
copyright infringement to hax e occurred, the Lords found the copyright to
be unenforceable for public polic\ reasons. Lord Griffiths, in dissent on

98. Ibid. at435
99. (1985),5C.RR. (3d)29
9(FC.TD.hrevd. onothergrounds(986)O, 10CP.R.(3d)28 )(FC.A.k
leave to appeal to ,CC demed i190St). 14 C.PR. (3d) 446 [Baivhner]
100. Ibid. (F.C.T.D ). at 30X (citing to (P.R' ,)
.
101. [ 19 ()] R.P(. 551 (( h.D.). [Swih Product Ltd.]
102 [1986] 1 A C 577 (H.L.). [Briti.sh Lcvland]
103. In British Levland, the objects in question were car mufflers. In Swivh Products, the objects
were office desk drawers.
104. R.S. 19 5, c. 1-9.
105. See, for example, David Vaser. (,qo.right Luit. (Concord Ont.: Irwin I a\, 2000) at 125 (suggesting that such an approach is stifling to creative and artstic expression).
106. See, for example, Britih Levland, supra note 102 at 613 (per Lord Scarman). at 614-5 (per
Lord Edmund-Daviesi. and at 623 and 625 iper Lord Bridge of Harwich).
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the issue of copyright infringement was critical of the majority. He
reasoned:
"reproducing" in s. 3(5) should not be gi,,cn the extended meaning of
"indirect copying" in cases in '. hich the mechanical drawing or blueprint
isof a purcly functional object. In such cases the scope of artistic copyright
should be limited to the natural meaning of the words, namely direct
copyving including use of the draw.ing to make the object it depicts."'7
In spite of the contro. crsv in Briti.4h Lviland, the Bavliner case has been
followed in Canada in Spiro-Flcv Industrie.s Ltd. v. Progressive Sealing
Iic. m0
.\lthough there is case la\\ that w\ould clearly support the view that the
makingz of the three dimensional object depicted in tw.'.o-dimensional plans
infringes the copyright in the plans, there is no authority in Canada to
support the view that taking a photograph, or making a painting, for example. of the three dimensional object amounts to an infringement of the
t\.,o dimensional plans. The leap is an enormous one. In making their
argument, the Society relied upon the English case, Dorling v. Honnor
\ arin Ltd. " In that case, the English Court of.Appeal considered whether
the copyright in plans for a sailing dinghy \ as infringed by the contents of
kits sold by the defendants. The kits contained parts that could be used to
construct the dinghy that was the subject of the plaintiff's copyright.
Included in the kits \%ere instructions to build the boat, including photographs of the dinghy or parts of it. The photos had been taken of the
completed boat or of the various parts made from the plans. In the words
of Danck erts J., '[t]he result, at an, rate in my opinion, was a series of
picture,, Mhich strongly resembled the draw'ings in the plaintiff's set of
plans." ' "' Danckwerts J. later went on to conclude that,
[t]he parts and the completed boat are reproductions of the t\\ o-dimensional
plans ... and the plans thus ha', ing been con', erted into a three-dimensional
form are reproduced by the photographs in a tm' o-dimensional fonn. It is
clearly a case of copying a copy of an artistic w'ork protected by the
Copy right Act. 1956, and, therefore, an infringement of copyright.''

107.
108.
109.
I10.
1It

I1d jdi 5
( 1996), 13 ( P.R. (3d) 31 1 (B.C
[19651 1 Ch. I (C \). [Dorhng]
Iid. at 17.
Ibid. at 22-23

" ) ['.,r,,I-/,' Industric]
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It is important to remember, however, that the photographs in issue were
part of a series of photographs, including photographs of individual parts
or components of the dinghy, combined with instructions and provided as
part of kits which would allow individuals to build replicas of the dinghy.
The particular factual context makes the case distinguishable from situations where a simple photograph is taken of a ship. On the facts of Dorling,
the photographs were part of a package aimed at facilitating the execution
of the copyright protected plans for the ship. It is because the photographs
are part of an overall strategy to infringe copyright in the plans that
infringement is found.'" 2
In Th~berge v.Galerie d 'Art du Petit Champlain,"3 Binnie J. for the

majority of the Supreme Court, in the context of a discussion of the meaning of the term "reproduction", noted: -[t]ransformation of an artistic work
from two dimensions to three dimensions, or vice versa, will infringe copyright even though the physical reproduction of the original expression of
that work has not been mechanically copied." ' 4 While it might be argued
that this statement supports the position that copyright in two-dimensional
plans can be infringed by a photograph of a three-dimensional reproduction of the plans, the argument is at best a stretch. Not only is the statement
made absent any relevant factual context, ' 5 it could equally stand for
nothing more than the proposition that copyright in a three-dimensional
artistic work such as a sculpture, can be infringed by taking a photograph
of the sculpture. This is a much more realistic interpretation of the scope
of the comment.

112. This interpretation is supported by the comments of Lord Griffiths in Brit t

LeYland, supra

note 102, at 651. In the words of Lord Griffiths: "The commercial value of Mr. Dorling's plans lay
in the fact that the kit parts and the boat could be constructed from the plans. The company by
copying the plans to produce the parts had stolen the value of Mr. Dorling's work and labour in
producing the plans and the photographs were but part and parcel of that theft for the, furthered itN
purpose hy facilitating the constructiono] the boat." (Emphasis added). It should also be noted that

in reaching his conclusion that the photographs of the three-dimensional object infringe the copyright
in the two dimensional plans of which the three-dimensional object is a reproduction. Danckwerts
J.relied upon s.48( 1) of the U.K. CopjrightA t,1956. which defines reproduction, in the case of an
artistic work, as including "a version produced by converting the work into a three-dimensional
form, or, if it is in three dimensions, by converting it into a two-dimensional form, and references to
reproducing a work shall be construed accordingl." (Copyrightlct. 1956, s. 48 1I)). The equivalent
provision does not exist in the Canadian Copyright 4ct, which refers instead, to reproduction 'in any
material form whatever" (Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-42. s. 30)).

113. [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336. [Th~berge]
114. Ibid. at para. 47.

115, Ibid. at para. 47. Binnie J. goes on to note that "Nevertheless, the important evolution of legal
concepts in the field of copyright is not engaged by the facts here."
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There are good public policy reasons to resist the copyright arguments
put forward by the Society in this case. The CoupvrighiActis quite specific
about the kinds of works that are intended to be covered by the Act.
Normally, utilitarian or functional items that are not inherently artistic
works, or works of artistic craftsmanship, are not protected under the Act.
Plans, including architectural and design plans, are protected as artistic
works, and the protection accorded these plans will prevent anyone from
"reproducing" the plans b\ building the object that is depicted in them.
Beyond that, it is not clear what public interest is served by extending
copy right protection so as to pre\ ent anyone from photographing the threedimensional object. In many instances, the object at issue will be functional or utilitarian. Absent any plans, it would not have been protected by
copyright. The further reach of protection \\ould place such an object on a
par, in terms of protection, with a sculpture. In addition, since the copyright concern is that no one be alloxwed to reproduce a set of plans or any
substantial part thereof xithout permission from the owner of copyright, it
is difficult to see how a photograph of a three-dimensional object could
amount to any kind of meaningful reproduction of the plans. It is not likely
that one can build a replica of a ship simply from a photograph of the ship
sailing by on a sunny day. It is possible that a series of photographs that
detail all of the parts and components of the ship, or which are done in
such a way as to include measurements and proportions might, taken
together, amount to an infringement of the copyright in the plans. Howexer. it is difficult to see ho\ a photograph of the Bluth'.rc II would give
an\ one much insight into the contents of the naval architectural plans for
its construction."'l
\ consideration of the consequences of an argument that a photograph
of a three-dimensional object made based on a set of tx\ o-dimensional plans
\ ill infringe the copyright in the plans demonstrate the absurdity of the
argument and the ramifications on a public policy lex el. Photographs regulark incorporate objects and items that are built from two-dimensional
design plans, as do sketches and paintings. If the Society's position were
accepted, a photograph of children playing at a unique modular playground
might infringe the copyright in the plans for the playground; a photograph
of a person standing on someone's front lax\ n might infringe the copyright
in the landscape design plans for that front lawn. The possible examples

116. \cws Release, lau note X It was not until 2002, and following "comprehensive historical
re,carch" that the society and the Canadian Mint were able to confirm that the schooner on the
Canadian 10 cent piece was,, in fact, the Bluenose.
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are limitless. \bsolutely no public purpose is scr\ d b\ extending copyright protection in design plans to this e\treme. l1c\ond the inherent
inseflsibilit\ of the argument, there are also further public policy
arguments that can be ad\anced under the \ct. These \\ill be considered in
the next section.
4. The Public Domain
In a series of recent copx right decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada has
taken an approach which is clearl\ protective both of the public domain,'"
and of the rights of users in relation to cop\ right protected xorks.ix More
specificall\, in Thkbergc, \\hich the Societ\ had cited as authority for its
position on cop\ right law. Binnie J.wrote: "'[t]he Copyright .Ict is usually
presented as a balance betwveen promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of \\ orks of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just rewNard for the creator.."

He added:

[t]he proper balance among thesc and other public policy objecti\ cs lies
not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in gix ing due weight to
their limited nature. In crassl\ economic terms it would be as inefficient

to o\ercornpensate artist, and authors for the right of reproduction as it
\%ould be self-defeating to undercompensatc them.' 2'
These comments have been cited and reiterated in CCH Canadian Ltd. v.
Law Society o?/'Ltk'r Canada. in which the Supreme Court of Canada
took an expansix e approach to the users' right of fair dealing, and in SOC. IN
I. C.A1Pl' - where the C ourt extended the protection of s. 2.4(1 )(b) of the
Copyright Act to Internet Service Providers.
The balancing approach to copyright mandated by the Supreme Court
of Canada should be sufficient to resolve any uncertainty about whether
photographs of three-dimensional objects built based on two-dimensional
plans infringe the copyright in the plans. To stretch copyright law to this
point would be to give the owner of copyright in the plans an inordinate

117. See, for example. Th ucr,'c. tp ra note 113. CC'H Canadian Ltd. v Lawi So, ict1 ,,/ 11ppci
Canada, [2004] 1 S.C-R 311-. 2004 s( ( 13
118. CCH Canadian Ltd. tid
119. Th~berge. supra note 113 at para. 30
120. Ibid.This interpretive approach has since been adopted in other cac 1,cc, for example, S, Ien of Composers. Authors and Alftsis Publishers ,/ (Canadau Canadian Ihvoctatimn ,/ InIsernet
Providers, [2002] 4 F.C. 3 (FCA) [SOCAi v CAIP]; CCH Canadian Lid., supra note 117.
121. Supra note 117.
122. SOC.Iv
CAID, supra note 120.
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power to control the rights of third parties in their interaction with the
three-dimensional object. In the case of the Bluenose II, the three-dimensional object is a ship, publicly visible as part of a harbour view. In other
instances, the three-dimensional object might be a piece of furniture in a
person's home, or any other item or object that can be built based on a set
of design plans. It serves no reasonable purpose, and is counter to the
public interest, to allow\ copy right lax\ to protect acts which do not in any
\\a amount to an attempt to reproduce the plans, or to produce in three
dimensions the object represented in the plans.
If common sense and the words of the Supreme Court of Canada are
not enough to lead to this conclusion, further support can be found in s.
32.2 of the ('Cl'right Act."' This section sets out a series of acts that, if
performed, do not infringe copyright. Of particular relevance in this case
is the follo\\ ing:
32.2 (1). It is not an infrin ement ot cop, right
(b) for an person to reproduce, in a painting. drak\ ing, engra\ ing,
photograph or cinematographic %ork

(i)an architectural k\ork, pro\ided the copy is not in the nature of
an architectural dra%\ ing or plan. or
(ii) a sculpturc or \%ork of artistic craftsmanship or a cast or model
of a sculpture or \\ork of artistic craftsmanship, that is
permanently situated in a public place or building

Thus, where the work at issue is an artistic '. ork in three dimensions, and
it is in a public space, it is not an infringement for members of the public to
interact with the work by taking photographs of it,
making sketches or
paintings of it. If this exception is present for three-dimensional artistic
\kworks. it is difficult to see why two-dimensional artistic works reproduced
in three dimensions should be insulated from similar acts, particularly \\ here
they are in public . ie". Although a three-masted schooner may not be
"permanently situated in a public place", it is permanently situated in
public places, and to find copyright in plans infringed by photos and
sketches of the ship flies in the face of the public policy expressed in s.
32.2(1 )(h).

123. Supra note t 12.
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Conclusion
The above anal' sis of the legal arguments advanced in the statement of
claim for the Society demonstrates that the Society's intellectual property
claims against Tall Ships and other local businesses and artists were largely
\\ ithout merit. Yet because ofthe high cost of defending oneself against
an
infringement suit, license fees \\ere paid to the Society for years, and by
many different parties,"4 In the case of the Blueno.sc 11, the fact that the
ship and its name \ ere a part of the history and culture of the people of the
province adds the sting of irony to any underlying injustice. The case
ser\es to highlight the significant defects in the official marks provisions
of the Tride-marks lct, the failure of the province of Nova Scotia to properl\ manage intellectual propert\ issues, and the broader issues raised by
the exploitation of poorly understood intellectual property law'.s by stronger parties at the expense of economically weaker parties.
The public outcry over the law suit brought by the Society against Tall
Ships is notexorth\." - Although few were able to understand the legal
basis for the intellectual property arguments asserted by the Society,
public concern flo\wed from an almost intuitive sense of the public
domain. As a public icon, a part of the province's heritage and history, and
an element of local culture, there was a public sentiment that the name and
image of the Bluenose H belonged to the people of Nova Scotia. In many
wvays copyright and trademark lawv actually create boundaries between what
can be pri\ ately owned and what is in the public domain. In this context,
the defects in the regime around official marks are particularly problematic, as they allo\\ for largely unchecked encroachments on the public space.
Further, the increasing creep of copyright law into the commercial context
has created a situation where copy right has become, in some cases, almost

124. Moore Affidavit, supra note 8 at para. 32.
125. The case generated extensive media interest. and prompted the intervention of the Attorney
General of Nova Scotia in the la ksuit launched in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, and the Attorney General of Nova Scotia's separate action to challenge the xaiidity of the official marks held by
the Society.
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a form of supCr-trademark protection."" The recent concern demonstrated
by the Supreme Court of Canada for the protection of the public domain
from cxcessivc privatization through copyright law is an indication of the
dimensions of the problem.

126. In both Conipagine G~n~rale des Etablissements Mic.helin - Michelin & Cie v National 4utomohtle 4erospa c, Transportation and General Iorkers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), [ 1997] 2
FC 306 (FC.T D.) and Roti.critrw% St-Hubert Lice v. Le S'indiat des Travailleurs de la Rotisserie

St Hubert de Drummondville (CS.N) (1986), 17 C.P.R. 13d) 461 (Q.S.C.), the courts dealt with
combined trademark and copyright infringement claims in relation to the use of corporate logos on
materials produced by unions in the course of labour disputes In both cases, the courts ruled that
trademark rights ocrc not infringed by the usc of the logos in the non-commercial protest context.
However, both courts ruled that copyright in the logos was infringed. The results are quite striking
and illustraic how copyright law can, in some cases, offer much more extensive protection to trademarks than was contemplated by the legislation. In another recent case, copyright law was used to
stop the parallel importation of goods in a context where no trademark rights were infringed. See
Kraft Canada Inc v EuroExcellence Inc. (2004), 33 C.P.R. (41h)246.

